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Abstract 
Aim of this paper is to illustrate the objects and relation between strategic trade policy and free trade by giving some theoretical 
results on the international trade. I will try to explain why economists for free trade start to defend some protectionist steps for some 
industries and why some countries protect their important industries to gain more, although they are members of GATT and WTO. 
 
There are a lot of theoretical and empirical studies on the possibility that strategic trade policies can enable firms to increase their 
share of rents from oligopolistic international markets. The theoretical strategic trade literature makes clear that this is a 
controversial result. Despite these concerns, the empirical literature continues to grow. 
 
In the same time, the attempts to liberalize the trade between nations are still growing. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the most cited examples of a successful international 
institution to liberalize international trade. But even if the WTO annual reports and website are analyzed, someone easily 
understand that GATT and WTO still have problems on applying free trade and telling itself to countries and individual whether 
GATT and WTO are for free trade or not. There are ten misunderstanding on the WTO website about WTO, most important of 
commercial interest takes priority  
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Management Conference 
 
 
Key words: Strategic Trade Policy, Free Trade, GATT and WTO.  
 
1. Introduction  
 International trade policy is one of the oldest subject areas in economics, having generated serious academic debate 
at least as far back as the classical period of ancient Greece, well over two thousand years ago. Interestingly, for 
example, both Plato and Aristotle were at best ambivalent about the virtues of open trade (Irwin, 1996).  
 Our modern understanding of international trade policy is based largely on the principle of comparative advantage 
as developed by David Ricardo and has been the focus of much political as well as academic debate and researches in 
the two centuries since Ricardo.  
aded the theory of international trade and the new  
trade theory was born. In contrast to traditional trade theory, supporters of the new view deny that free trade is always 
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sideration of strategic trade policy 
is a relatively recent addition to the international trade policy debate (Brander and Barbara Spencer, 1983,1985). 
 
2. Methodology 
 
I will explain first the strategic trade policy concept to put this policy features on the table and then developments 
about free trade activities done by GATT and WTO. Second I will try to compare whether strategic trade policy or free 
trade is realistic in the real world, what the developed countries like U.S., Japan and Europe as a hole is doing to make 
trade free or they are trying to protect their industries to get more gain in particular markets. 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
3.1. Strategic Trade Policy 
 
 In the early 1980s, James Brander and Barbara Spencer (1983, 1985) created a considerable stir with an analysis of 
trade policy under imperfect competition. They introduced economies of scale, product specialization and technology 
as new aspects for the basis of trade. The Brander-Spencer analysis offered a particularly clever way of setting up the 
case for activist trade policy, one which simplified the issue enormously and thereby revealed its core. This new trade 
theory provided at least limited support for a kind of neo-mercantilism, means that governments could in fact raise 
national incom
important part of the Brander- 
the creators of this approach did not aware of this new terms importance at that time.  
 According to the Krugman, this new theory was a revolution (Krugman, 1986). Because this rising so-
-left many of the insights of traditional trade theory intact. In particular, introducing imperfect 
competition and increasing returns into the picture does not alter the fundamental point that trade is a positive-sum 
 
enlarging markets, international trade increases competition and allows greater exploitation of economies of scale, 
both of which represent gains over and above those due to comparative advantage.  
 The main point of the approach was to find a way to make the aggressive competition credible. Industrial 
-that is, take actions that do not directly 
raise profits, but that are intended to make aggressive behavior more credible and therefore have a deterrent effect on 
potential rivals. The quintessential strategic move is construction of excess capacity, which a firm does not expect to 
use, but which it builds in order to deter entry of potential competitors.  
 What Brander and Spencer pointed out was that trade policies could serve the same strategic purpose (Brander and 
Spencer, 1983,1985). Suppose that one of the two firms is backed by a government, which commits itself to subsidize 
 an aggressive policy by the subsidized firm is rational and will 
 
 These academic researches showed that, the case for strategic trade policies was different from the traditional case 
for free trade. Optimal strategic trade policy is sensitive to the details of the market and could be made a priori without 
consideration of the specific details of industries. Strategic trade policies could be recommended, only on the basis of 
detailed quantitative knowledge of the relevant industries.  
 What do these researches tell us? First, the models generally suggest that the positive economics of strategic trade 
policy- its consequences for output and trade flows-are quite different from the predictions of conventional trade 
theory. In particular, protection, by encouraging entry of domestic firms, often promotes exports. In some cases, this 
result alone is of some importance for policy disputes (Baldwin and Krugman 1988).  
 In light of this new approach, many policy suggestions appeared diametrically different to those previously 
proposed in a purely domestic context (Pawel Streblov, 2001). For example, oligopolistic structures were generally 
seen as detrimental to national welfare, but in the international context they were seen as a political instrument of 
national welfare in the competition for product market rents. After these explanations we can give a basic definition 
the strategic trade policy refers to trade policy that affects the outcome of strategic 
interactions between firms in an actual or potential .  
 
between firms. Strategic interaction requires that firms recognize that their payoffs in terms of profit or other 
objectives are directly affected by the decisions of rivals or potential rivals. As a result, firms recognize that their own 
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choices concerning such variables as output, price and investment depend on the decisions of other firms. The 
existence of strategic interaction is the defining characteristic of oligopoly. Strategic trade policies that change the 
incentives for investment or research and development (R&D) in the context of international oligopoly represent an 
important application in the literature. 
 
two or more countries. Trade policy instruments set by one country then tend to affect the strategic choices of firms 
located in that country differently from firms located abroad. Strategic trade policy typically exploits these differential 
effects so as to achieve a domestic objective at the expense of welfare in other countries. In much of the literature the 
domestic objective is to maximize aggregate domestic welfare, but there is nothing that rules out political economy 
objectives, such as the use of trade policy to reward special interest groups that provide large donations to the 
government.  
 With the introduction of strategic trade policy 
trade were undermined.  New applications of the models of imperfect competition seemed to justify increased 
government intervention. In order to explain various trends in post-world war II trade, the international analysis using 
perfect competition has been replaced by the analysis that incorporates an imperfect market structure. Either one very 
big firm (a monopoly) or a few large firms producing slightly differentiated products can represent this imperfect 
market structure. 
 All countries (governments) in the modern world need a framework for engaging in interactions across national 
boundaries. As far as international trade is concerned, the implicit format of this framework comes under the heading 
of strategic policy making. It involves various types of interventions able to deal with various dynamics of the 
international trading world such as export subsidies, R&D rivalry, international economies of scale, and national and 
international spillovers. The timing and the availability of information about target markets and institutions are also 
important in this strategic trade policy. As we have seen up to now, assumptions about production and consumption 
are very important for the governments who want to affect interactions between producers and consumers beyond 
national borders (Basu, 2002). 
 
modify the terms of those interactions. The government wants to utilize this opportunity to increase domestic welfare. 
One necessary assumption in this type of sequential game is that government needs to pre-commit to its policy, as 
reflected in the government being the first player in the entire game of strategic decision making. 
 There were two separate, but related theoretical justifications for the government to actively promote the interests 
of domestic firms. The first, the government could alter the strategic interaction in oligopolistic competition to shift 
profits to a domestic firm. The second, the government could promote key industries in order to capture the benefits of 
positive externalities. In both cases, perceived market failures provided intellectual justification for the government to 
make a strategic choice to increase national welfare. With these measures the governments were expected to shape the 
market by strategic action to enable its firms to gain rents in imperfectly competitive international markets (Silva, 
2001). 
 It was stressed above that the main objective of strategic trade policy consists of a support and a stimulus to the 
growth of sectors regarded as strategic aiming to increase national income (Silva, 2001).  This would be possible 
through the rise of the remuneration of factors in the strategic sectors higher than their opportunity cost. This increase 
- made possible through the sharing of the monopolist rent to the benefit of national oligopolized firms and to the 
detriment of foreign firms - would more than compensate the likely reduction of the remuneration of factors in the 
non-strategic sectors and the costs of structural adjustment due to a shift in the allocation of factors. So a trade policy 
is strategic to the extend that the action of the governments with the domestic sector aims to induce a reaction of the 
other governments or foreign firms in order to get a gain (Brander, 1986).  
 
3.2. Key Industries (Strategic Sectors) 
 
 When we look at this explanation, problems appear to choose national key industries that are worth being 
strategically supported in the international market by governments. The government, in spite of its limited resources, 
can shift the economic activity from one sector or industry to the other. When picking some key industries it can help 
them gain a strategic advantage in the international market. High technology industries that can gain a substantial part 
of the world market where economy wide externalities are present should be promoted as key industries.  
 Barbara Spencer specifically addressed the problem of how to define a strategic sector (key industry) in her paper 
 
 The sector must have the potential for gaining additional profits higher than the subsidy.  
1286   Bilgin Orhan ÖRGÜN /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  58 ( 2012 )  1283 – 1292 
 An oligopolistic structure. 
 High concentration in relation to competing foreign industry. 
 High level of barriers to entry, notwithstanding legal barriers, investment in excess capacity and/or R&D.  
 The sector must be submitted to strong international competition. 
 The sector must have a comparative advantage, economies of scale and learning effects; the costs in R&D and 
capital must be the main part of the costs of the new products.  
 The public intervention must occur in the beginning of the life cycle of the product; this intervention must appear 
as a credible threat and to discourage a similar intervention of a foreign country;  
 The technology of the firms in the sector should generate a technological spillover effect in all the national 
economy; the government should favor the transfer of technology to national firms.  
 In the beginning, the costs of the factors in the subsidized sector should not be increased, because in these 
circumstances the initial advantage would disappear.  
 An oligopolized structure that will allow benefit from economies of scale.  
 Sufficiently high barriers to assure that the benefits from the economies of scale are not eliminated with the advent 
of new firms.  
 R&D investment must be the main strategic orientation of the firms in the sector; in these circumstances, the 
strengthening of national firms are viewed as a means of benefiting the economy as a whole with the diffusion of 
technological spillovers (Spencer, 1986).  
 
3.3. Rationales for Strategic Trade Policies  
  
 Brander explained tha
does not describe the reality sufficiently. So these arguments should be analyzed in more detail. First, it is the criticism 
of the classical theory, which sees the main source of international trade in different factor endowments of the 
countries (Brander, 1986). Krugman had a counterargument in the same year that, since World War II, a large and 
generally growing part of world trade cannot be explained by the underlying advantages of the countries involved in 
the exchange (Krugman, 1986) rbitrary or temporary advantages resulting from 
economies of scale (using large scale production) or shifting leads in close technological races (R&D and 
 can influence 
the comparative advantage of individual countries.  
 Another related argument, maybe one of the most important in this discussion, is imperfect competition and the 
existence of market failures due to the existence of the above-mentioned factors that influence the pattern of trade and 
competition. This situation occurs when just few firms compete in one sector of the world market. Consequently, each 
firm is not the perfect-competition price taker but can influence the price of its product, sometimes significantly. The 
following consequence of such a situation is usually a price that ensures the firms of earning profits that are above the 
rate of return earned in purely competitive industries. In this sense, trade policy can serve for a given country as a tool 
for obtaining as large a share of these international profits as possible. As Brander states, implementing strategic 
 (Brander, 1986).  
 With this knowledge we can approach the second point of the argument, namely the question of whether free trade 
is the best way to exploit comparative advantage under the re-defined circumstances. According to Krugman, 
phenomena like economies of scale, learning curves an
 (Krugman, 1986). 
licy can bring higher benefit in 
 
 As far as the first point is concerned, it is relatively easy to measure the advantage gained. If the government is 
able to pick and support such industry, where important rents are to achieve, then the government can increase the 
national income this way. As mentioned above, these are usually sectors where oligopolistic structures prevail. 
Therefore, the imperative of the strategic trade policies would be a certain kind of support for domestic industry to 
expand in these sectors.  
 The government can ensure the long-term viability of domestic companies by subsidizing the sunk costs of setting 
up large operations with spare capacity. Domestic companies could then be more resistant to foreign competitors 
profit can be achieved than are earned in other industries of equivalent risk. Through the subsidies of domestic 
companies, foreign competitors could be partially driven out of concentrated international markets (in other words, a 
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kind of dumping). If other governments do not retaliate, the rent can be shifted from the foreign producers to domestic 
than compensate for this loss (Sharma, 1993).  
 Another benefit of strategic trade policies was seen in the potential to gain more external economies. It was argued 
that even other domestic firms might benefit from the activity of a supported firm, in spite of not being engaged in its 
activity. According to Krugman, the most plausible of external economies presents the diffusion of knowledge 
generated in the supported firm to other firms and other sectors. The feature of many industries that are the most adept 
at using strategic policies is that they are employing a skilled workforce, have advanced technology and can become a 
source of technological spillovers. Krugman emphasizes not only the importance of R&D spillovers, but also the role 
of innovation, because it also involves the generation of knowledge and is likely also to generate valuable spillovers 
for the rest of the economy (Krugman, 1986). 
 
3.4. Strategic Trade Policy and Industrial Policies  
  
 Industrial policy is defined as government attempts to allocate resources to industries, which the government views 
as valuable to the country and important for growth. The government should, according to this approach, subsidize 
select corporations that produce high value-added goods. In this way the government enables them to generate rents 
and provide well-paid jobs in the country. In comparison with some other policies like export subsidies and 
countervailing duties, this approach aims to target potential winners in growth industries and to encourage their 
development by direct production subsidies, tax preferences and other means. It is hoped that, if selected carefully, the 
domestic industries will be able to capture a certain share of the world markets. But the prerequisite of industrial 
spillover effects, and the reaction of our trading partners before picking corporations that are to receive government 
because the aim is to shift resources within the country. This can lead to a situation that outperforms the market 
outcome, but might otherwise negatively influence the development of the country when some aspects are omitted 
from the analysis. The risk is, for example, connected with the negative impact on other industries with which the 
subsidized industries compete for resources (Kreinin, 1995).  
 It is probably one of the most serious differences between strategic trade and industrial policy: industrial policies 
were usually focused on the development of domestic industry and industrial structure with the vision of possible 
success in the world market, while strategic trade policies use primarily the second argument, namely rent-shifting in 
an oligopolistic world market. An industrial policy can succeed even in a market segment with less imperfect market 
competition, whereas strategic trade policies select just those sectors where the competition is apparently imperfect.  
 With respect to the theoretical trends in the theory on strategic trade policies, some new arguments for industrial 
policy can be found. The relationship between industrial organization and market power can be interpreted in two 
different ways (Tolentino, 2000). The first view considers the firm as a reactive or passive product of changes in 
market structure and the transaction costs of markets. The second approach, which is supported especially by 
Schumpeter and Galbraith, considers the development of the market structure more like a dynamic process where each 
firm is considered to be an active agent that employs its own strategies and tactics to secure monopoly power and 
benefits. This causes higher levels of industrial concentration. In describing the strategic behavior of firms, the second 
approach seems to be more accurate. It would be very hard to analyze with the help of classical instruments the 
behavior under dynamic development of equilibrium with respect to continual innovations, new techniques or 
production.  
 
3.5. Applications of Strategic Trade Policies 
 
 The new theory of strategic trade policies, with its analysis of trade in international markets, has led to new 
arguments for trade intervention and is often used as intellectual support for protectionist policies.  
 Strategic trade policies and the theory of their application have several constrains. First, some application 
constraints result from the conditions by which the models are built up. Second, constraints are connected with the 
application problems of theoretically desired measures. From the first set of constraints, two stand out. These are the 
conditions on the market and the present and expected position of the firm in the selected market.  
In an oligopolistic and segmented market the existence and persistence of oligopoly profits are expected. In such a 
market, even a small country can gain by using a tariff to shift rents from foreign firms to domestic taxpayers. We can 
add that according to the new trade policy, domestic taxpayers can be better off even when trade policy instruments 
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like subsidies are used. Subsidies enable the domestic firm to capture a larger share of the market and, due to 
oligopoly profits; the subsidy can be more than compensated. This offers a new argument for using tariffs or other 
trade policy measures. Such measures were often justified by the existence of domestic distortions that lead to a 
difference between private and social costs (Mikic, 1998). 
 
3.5.1. Domestic Market Protection 
  
 The threat of imposing tariffs to protect domestic production is typical of protectionis
promotion.  
 One of the standard arguments in this field was the infant-industry argument (Mikic, 1998). The main idea behind 
this argument is the temporary protection of an industry in order to enable it to develop into an internationally 
competitive industry. Because of the protection, the industries would have a chance to grow and become more 
efficient. But it does not consider the strategic behavior that is incorporated into strategic trade policies. It might be 
argued that firms would always have an incentive to endure losses in order to make long-term profits. The incentive to 
invest in such industry should exist even without the need for government assistance.  
 But there are two additional reasons for the infant industries needing government assistance due to domestic 
distortions: market failures like the imperfection of the information flow or the imperfection of the local capital market 
or externalities (Mikic, 1998). In the strategic trade theory the argument for industry protection has been further 
developed. It shows that, in certain cases, the protection of a domestic market against foreign firms helps domestic 
firms not only in the protected domestic market but in export markets as well. This happens in cases when the 
conditions examined for selected sector in the previous sections are fulfilled. Besides the existence of oligopoly 
profits, the presence of increasing returns of scale contributes to this strategic argument.  
 Due to the protection of a domestic market, a domestic firm can raise its output in the domestic market. As the 
output increases, the marginal costs decrease and the domestic firm is able to expand its world-market share and 
increase its profit from its international market operations. In the world of perfect competition and constant-returns-to-
scale, import tariffs can never turn the goods from being import substitutes to being exportable goods. 
 Brander argues that pure cases of declining marginal costs are probably rare. But as is empirically more relevant, 
the effects of learning by doing could lead us to the same results (Brander, 1986). Due to the protection of the 
domestic firm it can produce more for the domestic market and this would allow it to shift its learning curve quicker 
than foreign rivals. This could again lead to higher profits in export markets than it otherwise would. In both cases, the 
welfare effects of such measures are not easy to calculate. The firm benefits from its better position in foreign markets 
as well as in the domestic market, where it might gain almost monopoly power and might charge higher prices. On the 
other hand, the impact on domestic consumers is negative. It might even cause a shift of resources from other domestic 
industries and this way hurt other sectors of domestic economy.  
 Strategic arguments for domestic market protection can be based on even looser conditions. Brander presents the 
situation in which incremental costs might be constant but with substantial fixed costs. Even in this case a tariff could 
increase national welfare, enabling domestic companies to lower their marginal costs due to restricted domestic 
competition and in this way enabling them to make a profit in the international market. The tariff then serves again to 
shift rents from foreign producers to domestic firms and taxpayers (Brander, 1986). 
 
3.5.2. Profit-shifting Subsidy 
 
Export-supporting subsidy is another favorite policy tool to achieve a strategic advantage. The standard criticism 
of export subsidies was their national welfare-decreasing effect. Subsidies were usually introduced, when firms 
produced inefficiently in comparison to the world market price and, in order to maintain their export capabilities, the 
government had to support them. If we do not take into account the possible political and strategic-political reasons, 
balance of payment or employment arguments, such policies usually do not pay off for the domestic country.  
Under imperfect competition and in certain circumstances an export subsidy can raise the national welfare. If the 
rofits is higher than the subsidies paid by the government, the welfare of the country 
might be raised (Brander and Spencer, 1985). Brander (1986) compares this with a duopoly situation, in which one 
company discovers how to produce output more efficiently, thanks to decreased costs. In case the foreign competitor 
believes this increased competitiveness is not temporary, a logical reaction would be to contract its own output. The 
benefits for the domestic company are then twofold; first, it increased profits due to reduced costs and, second, it 
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improved its market position and therefore further increased its profits. In the end, the total benefits for the firm might 
be higher than the total savings (Brander, 1986). 
 
3.6. General problems of implementation 
 
 The implementation of strategic trade or industrial policies is riddled with several practical problems and 
difficulties which may dilute the expected effects and advantages of proposed policies:  
 Governments do not have all the necessary information on the profitability of supported business activity, 
 
 It is not easily predictable how much rent will persist in given industry; it depends on the reactions of the trading 
partners. The rent might be competed off even if more competitors enter the market. 
 The support of one industry might have negative effects on other industries (removal of production factors or 
increase of their prices, for example skilled labor force). 
 The support of the domestic firm may induce more domestic firms to enter the industry, which may result in lower 
efficiency; higher average costs and the benefits from rent-shifting may be offset by increased production costs 
(Kreinin, 1995).  
 The welfare effects of strategic trade policies are dependent on the ownership pattern of the companies in the 
market. Higher internationalization of ownership reduces positive welfare effects of rent-shifting in the hands of 
domestic citizens.  
 The predictions are very sensitive to assumptions made on competition in a given market and the behavior of the 
competitors. 
 The government may be unable to commit far into the future. Some policies may not remain in force when firms 
make their decision on output and prices (Neary and Leahy, 2000).  
 Under information constraint there is a potential for strategic failure, due to which the policies may not lead to the 
most appropriate outcome for the society (for example, the underdevelopment of a sector generating valuable 
spillovers (Krugman, 1986).  
 The efficiency of spillover effects depends on their structure. The more important the intraindustry spillovers, the 
lower the effects of domestic R&D activity. 
  
 
3.7. GATT and WTO  
 
 The WTO began life on 1 January 1995, but its trading system is half a century older. Since 1948, GATT had 
an unofficial, de facto international organization, also known informally as GATT. Over the years GATT evolved 
through several rounds of negotiations. The last and largest GATT round, was the Uruguay Round which lasted from 
dealt with trade in goods, the WTO and its 
agreements now cover trade in services, and in traded inventions, creations and designs (intellectual property) (WTO 
(2011), Annual Report Special Topic: Globalization and Trade, Geneva.). 
 The WTO agreements are generally lengthy and complex because they are legal texts covering a wide range of 
activities. But a number of simple, fundamental principles run throughout all of these documents. These principles are 
the foundation of the multilateral trading system. According to the WTO principles of the multilateral trading system 
should be; 
 
favoured- ts own and foreign products, services or nationals 
 
 Freer: barriers coming down through negotiation, 
 Predictable: foreign companies, investors and governments should be confident that trade barriers (including tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers) should not be raised arbitrarily; tariff rates and market-
the WTO;  
 
gain market share. 
system does allow tariffs and, in limited circumstances, other forms of protection. More accurately, it is a system of 
rules dedicated to open, fair and undistorted competition.  
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 More beneficial for less developed countries:  giving them more time to adjust, greater flexibility, and special 
privileges. 
 Multilateral trading system is operated by the WTO. Most nations - including almost all the main trading nations - 
countries. Thi
 
 GATT and WTO efforts have significantly contributed to the consolidation of a free trade policy in multilateral 
trading system. However, the strategic choices available to governments were limited by regulations on export and 
domestic production subsidies, making what was once conceptually desirable as a strategic trade policy now rather 
impractical.  
 It is obvious that the GATT has not been an institution able to fully achieve its own objectives because the 
structure in the markets of the most dynamic products, like those of high-technology industries, has been developing 
toward imperfect competition. Furthermore, the US as well as the EU and Japan increasingly subsidize (i.e., they 
protect), some products of high technology industries. While this trend will not be turned upside down, or at least 
disciplined according to the rules of GATT, a truly liberalization of trade will be impossible, and the appeal of 
strategic trade policy over policy makers will remain particularly difficult to weaken. Will the WTO and the new trade 
round be able, through reciprocal concessions, to persuade the contracting parties of the advantages of liberalization in 
the global economy? In any event, a shift toward more cooperative games rather than non-cooperative, as strategic 
trade policy, would surely have positive effects on the negotiations. 
 
3.8. International Relations and International Agreements 
 
 The results of strategic trade policy depend on various factors: the market structure, the type of competition among 
firms, the timing for the action of the players (firms and governments), and the temporal size of the game. The results 
are not conclusive and consequently cannot serve as a basis for the policies of strategic traders; and perhaps, more 
often, they call them into question, at least as far as they reinforce the asymmetrical development of the world 
economy. This asymmetrical development of world economy will normally effect the international relations not only 
economically also politically. 
 The issue of "free trade versus strategic trade policy" has not yet been clearly solved at the level of the main 
theoreticians of international trade, through both alternatives have influenced policy makers, particularly in the USA, 
EU and Japan in one way or another as well. Taking into consideration the political appeal of strategic trade policy, it 
certainly plays a major role in a few but relevant fields for international trade. 
 Critics as well as defenders of strategic trade policy theoretically recognize that any intervention will likely 
diminish global welfare, even if it may increase the welfare of one or more countries. So, it is always better to achieve 
agreement on the elimination of tariff or non-tariff barriers and other difficulties of access to markets than to follow 
the neo-protectionism. 
 Within this explanation, the strategic trade policy of each partner, country etc. is closely to the strategic trade 
policy of the others. In these circumstances, a very important question we have to answer is which of the following 
scopes will be adopted by economic policy makers in the world: 
 To increase liberalization following the pattern of multilateralism; 
 Or, a neo-protectionistic stance according to the defenders of strategic trade policy. 
 Putting it another way: is it more likely that the countries will play a cooperative game according to the principles 
and norms of GATT/WTO or, on the other hand, is it more likely they will play a non-cooperative game in conformity 
with the precepts of strategic trade policy? 
 Because tariff or/and quota restrictions are restrained by international agreements and their imposition might cause 
incremental political costs. It cannot be expected that other countries would not reflect domestic protectionist 
measures that might hurt their interests.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 Analyzing of these theoretical information about strategic trade policy gives us an idea of how difficult it is to 
draw definite conclusions to choose whether strategic trade policy or free trade. Everything is still in an open state and 
the results of strategic trade policy depend on various factors: the market structure, the type of competition among 
firms, the timing for the action of the players (firms and governments), and the temporal size of the game. The results 
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are not conclusive and consequently cannot serve as a basis for the policies of strategic traders; and perhaps, more 
often, they call them into question, at least as far as they reinforce the asymmetrical development of the world 
economy.  
 Furthermore the WTO has not been an institution able to fully achieve its own objectives because the structure in 
the markets of the most dynamic products, like those of high-technology industries, has been developing toward 
imperfect competition. The US as well as the EU and Japan increasingly subsidize (i.e., they protect), some products 
of high technology industries. 
 The issue of "free trade versus strategic trade policy" has not yet been clearly solved at the level of the main 
theoreticians of international trade, through both alternatives have influenced policy makers, particularly in the USA, 
EU and Japan in one way or another as well. Taking into consideration the political appeal of strategic trade policy, it 
certainly plays a major role in a few but relevant fields for international trade. 
 It is obvious that these debates and researches will not end, and economists are willing to open these areas to 
discuss because there are a lot of unexplained points. WTO is the main body to make trade free between countries all 
countries and has some misunderstandings on WTO activities. 
Finally, the issue of "free trade versus strategic trade policy" needs to be illustrated and researched in detail. 
Research should be in detail and industry level to explain which industry deserves to be protected. 
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